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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MISSHAPEN DISTRICTS, MISTAKEN JURISPRUDENCE: THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS ON PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING

The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not
want virtue, but are dupes of pretended patriots. – Elbridge Gerry 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2006 elections produced great change in America’s political
landscape. For only the second time in the last half century, control of the
House of Representatives switched parties between the Republican Party and
the Democratic Party. 2 Despite broad discontent with President George W.
Bush, the Iraq war and a scandal-plagued Republican party, the election was
not as competitive as it first appears. Out of 435 seats up for election, 317
races had margins of victory greater than 20%. 3 Sixty races were decided by
fewer than 10% of the vote, and in only thirty-four districts did the runner-up
finish within 5% of the vote of the winner. 4 Fourteen states had no
competitive Congressional races and thirty-five seats went completely
uncontested. 5 In California, only two of fifty-three seats were decided by
fewer than twenty points. 6 This lack of competitiveness is not a natural
phenomenon.
At the end of the Nineteenth Century, fully half of

1. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JACK WALTER PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE
PEOPLE, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 49
(Prentice-Hall, 6th ed. 1963).
2. Office of the Clerk, Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present),
available at http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2007).
3. Editorial, Redistricting Reconsidered: Does Election 2006 Show That Fears About
Partisan Gerrymandering Were Overblown? WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A20.
4. Id.
5. CNN.com, America Votes 2006, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/
pages/results/house/full.list (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
6. Id.
389
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Congressional elections were decided by fewer than ten points. 7 These onesided elections are the direct result of gerrymandering. 8
Gerrymandering is neither new nor single-minded in its purpose. The
word itself derives from a portmanteau of the name of Massachusetts Governor
Elbridge Gerry and the word salamander. 9 As Governor in 1812, Gerry signed
a bill that created a salamander-shaped district designed to disadvantage his
political opponents. 10 Gerrymandering is not only deep-rooted in American
electoral politics; it is also quite versatile. In California, lawmakers
successfully drew districts to maintain the status quo and to protect
incumbents. 11
In Pennsylvania, Republican legislators “kidnapped”
Democratic Representative Frank Mascara by placing his home in the same
district as another Democrat, John Murtha. 12 The district lines came down the
middle of his street up to his house and stopped; he lived in the eighteenth
district but parked his car in the twelfth. 13 Gerrymandering has been used to
assure proportional representation between Democrats and Republicans, 14 to
disadvantage racial minorities, 15 and to provide a district that represents
specific interests. 16
Two developments have made gerrymandering more prevalent over the
last few decades. First, the Supreme Court’s decisions leading to “one-man,
one-vote” principle 17 have increased the frequency of both redistricting and
gerrymandering. Prior to these decisions, most states only redistricted when
the state gained or lost a seat in the House of Representatives due to population
shifts. 18 Pursuant to these decisions, every state is required to redraw its
7. Joanne Dann, Redistricting Works Against Moderates By Creating ‘Safe’ House
Districts, Lawmakers Encourage Hardliner Candidates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 2001, at
G1.
8. In Iowa, where a nonpartisan commission draws the district map, four out of five races
were within fifteen points. In California, where the state legislature draws the districts, fortyeight of fifty-three elections were decided by 20% or more. CNN.com, supra note 5.
9. The Maven’s Word of the Day, Feb. 2, 1999, http://www.randomhouse.com/wotd/
index.pperl?date=19990202 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
10. Id.
11. Adam Clymer, The Nation: Democracy in Middle America; Why Iowa Has So Many Hot
Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at § 4.
12. Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat
to Democracy?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63.
13. Id.
14. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
15. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
16. In California, a district was created along the Pacific coast to represent the views of
coastal residents. This district spans over 500 miles of coast and is in some places less than 500
yards wide. Rachel Morris, The Race to Gerrymander: Democrats Have a Parallel Campaign to
Win the House; It Starts in the States, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2006, at 15.
17. Dann, supra note 7.
18. Id.
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district lines every ten years according to the census. 19 Frequent redistricting
leads to more and more partisan battles over lines on a map. 20 The other
development is the growth of computer technology. While Governor Gerry
may have known the general area where his supporters and opponents lived,
computers have greatly increased the precision of the gerrymander. 21 Maps
are so precise that individual blocks within neighborhoods are segmented to
the mapmaker’s desire. 22 The increased use of demographic research also
allows a degree of precision never before imagined. These advances have led
to some of the most oddly shaped districts one could imagine. 23
The ability to cause drastic change simply by redistricting has led several
states to adopt objective standards for redistricting or to employ nonpartisan
committees to draw the maps. Iowa is generally considered the preeminent
model for nonpartisan districting. Iowa’s districting is handled by the
Legislative Service Bureau, which is prohibited from viewing partisan data
when creating the map. 24 Additionally, counties may not be split, and
contiguity must be maintained. 25 Seven states have instituted reforms in the
districting process. 26 Sixteen additional states have sponsored bills or
constitutional amendments to take the redistricting process out of the hands of
the state legislature. 27
Gerrymandering, in its various forms, has been around for nearly two
centuries, but its modern use has become more effective and divisive. In the

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 345
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Toobin, supra note 12; Clymer, supra
note 11; Dann, supra note 7.
22. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Toobin, supra note 12.
23. For pictures of gerrymandered maps, see generally CNN.com, America Votes 2006
House Map, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/house/map.html (map of entire
country); see, e.g., Tennessee Congressional Districts, http://rangevoting.org/TN_CDloc.pdf (map
of Tennessee—note Districts 3 and 7); Congressional Districts Compared, http://rangevoting.org/
TexasRedist.jpg (map of Texas before and after the 2003 redistricting); The Pennsylvania
Marketing and Planning Center, PA—Before and After the 2001 Reapportionment,
http://www.mapcenter.org/region/gerrymaps.html (map of Pennsylvania before and after the 2001
redistricting); Gerry’s Gallery, http://www.westmiller.com/fairvote2k/in_gerry.htm (collection of
bizarrely-shaped districts) (all websites last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
24. Dann, supra note 7.
25. Id.
26. HAW. REV. STAT § 25-2 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1506 (2006); IOWA CODE §
42.4(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1206, 1206-A (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 51-115 (2003); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (1994).
27. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia.
Redistricting Reform Watch, http://www.fairvote.org/index.php?page=1389 (last visited Mar. 18,
2007).
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past, redistricting occurred, at most, once a decade. While the partisan battles
were fierce, they were limited. In 2003, the Texas legislature attempted to
redistrict for the second time in the decade. 28 If the political gambit worked,
the Texas legislature would have forever changed the future of
gerrymandering.
This comment will first present the facts and procedural history of League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry. Then it will trace the history of
partisan gerrymandering 29 via the Supreme Court’s chief opinions in Davis v.
Bandemer (“Bandemer”), Vieth v. Jubelirer (“Vieth”), and League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry (“League”). Each opinion will be critiqued
regarding the guidance it gives the lower courts and the limitations it would
place on the state legislatures. This comment will also discuss and explain the
rationale for declaring partisan gerrymandering justiciable. Finally, this
comment will set forth a standard for when mid-decade redistricting and
partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional.
II. FACTS OF LEAGUE
In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court issued its controversial decision
in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 30 approving the blatant
partisan gerrymandering that occurred in Texas during 2003. The case’s
background is convoluted yet intriguing. In 1990, the decennial census
resulted in Texas receiving thirty seats in the House of Representatives—an
increase of three seats from the previous decade. 31 Accordingly, the
Democratically-controlled Texas Legislature redrew the Congressional district
map. 32 Using the current but diminishing Democratic majority and newly
emerging computer software, the Democrats designed what has been called the
“shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990’s.” 33 The results of this map were
remarkable. In 2000, using the still applicable 1990 map, Texas Democrats
lost the governorship and control of the State Senate and only carried 41% of
the vote for statewide offices, yet still won seventeen of the thirty
Congressional seats. 34

28. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2606 (2006).
29. “Partisan gerrymandering” and “political gerrymandering” are both used to describe the
same phenomenon. Unless taken from a direct quote, this comment will use “partisan
gerrymandering.”
30. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. 2594.
31. Id. at 2605.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting M. BARONE & R. COHEN, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004 1510
(2003).
34. Id. at 2605-06.
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The 2000 census led to an increase of two more Congressional seats for
Texas, bringing the state’s total number of seats to thirty-two. 35 Once again,
the legislature was charged with redrawing the state’s district map. 36 Due to
the fact that the Republicans controlled the State Senate and the Democrats
controlled the State House of Representatives, the legislature was unable to
come to a consensus on changes to district boundaries. 37
The “unwelcome obligation” of redrawing the map was left to a threejudge panel of federal judges in the Eastern District of Texas. 38 In Balderas v.
Texas, the district court enacted what is known as Plan 1151C. 39 The court
applied “only ‘neutral’ redistricting standards” when it drew the new map. 40
These standards included placing new districts in high-growth areas, applying
county and voting precinct lines, and avoiding pairing incumbents in the same
district. 41 Then, the Balderas court conformed the map to the one person-one
vote principle. 42
In the 2002 Congressional election, Republicans did not win as many seats
as they had expected. 43 Despite winning 59% of the vote in statewide
elections, Texas Republicans were elected to only a minority of Texas’s seats
in the U.S. House. 44 The Republicans, however, did gain a majority in the
Texas House of Representatives, which gave them control of both houses of
the state legislature and the governorship. 45
The Republicans then began their quest to gain seats in Congress through a
mid-decade redistricting. 46 “There is little question but that the single-minded
purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan
advantage.” 47 To prevent redistricting, Democratic members of the Texas
House of Representatives absented themselves in order to frustrate quorum

35. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 35673966 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
2001) (per curium)).
39. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2606.
43. Id.
44. Id. Texas Republicans received fifteen of thirty-two Congressional seats. The majority
opinion League does not take into account incumbency as a reason that the court-enforced plan
may not have immediately resulted in a Republican majority.
45. Id.
46. Id.; id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D.
Tex. 2004)); id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirements. 48 After the legislature failed to redistrict during the regular
session, Republican Governor Rick Perry called a special session to redraw the
district maps—an act he refused to do in 2001. 49 The House soon approved a
new map, but the Democratic Senators took advantage of a long-standing
tradition that allowed a filibuster unless overruled by two-thirds of the
Senators. 50
During a second special session, Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst
suspended operation of the Senate filibuster. 51 Every Democratic Senator then
left the state to prevent a quorum in the second special session. 52 After the
return of a lone Democratic State Senator, Governor Perry called a third
special session to approve a new map. 53 During this session, the Texas
legislature approved Plan 1374C, which was the subject of League. 54
Plan 1374C dramatically changed the landscape of the Texas districting
map. Over one third of the state’s population was shifted to different districts
than under Plan 1151C. 55 Additionally, the newly drawn districts were on the
whole less compact 56 than under the previous plan. 57
A.

Procedural History

Soon after Plan 1374C was enacted by the state, several lawsuits were filed
claiming that the redistricting was unconstitutional. 58 A coalition comprised of
voters, interest groups, members of Congress, and a city claimed that Plan
1374C violated the Census, Elections, and Equal Protections Clauses of the
U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. 59 The District Court for the

48. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
55. Eight million residents of Texas were redrawn into different districts. Id. The
population of Texas as of 2000 was 20,851,820. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick
Facts: Texas, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2007).
56. Compactness is often used as an objective standard to prove gerrymandering.
“Compactness” can be determined by several methods, including the ratio of the area of a district
to the area of the smallest circle that would fit around the entire district or the ratio of the area to
the perimeter. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 348 n.3 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630-31 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
58. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 457.
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Eastern District of Texas entered judgment against the plaintiffs. 60 The
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded all the cases back to
the district court to decide the issue in light of Vieth v. Jubelirer. 61 On remand,
the district court again rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. 62
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in League is nothing short of convoluted.
In total, the case contains six different opinions and over seventy-five pages. 63
Every Justice dissented or separately concurred in part to at least one portion of
the plurality opinion, and only two Parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion received
enough support to garner a majority. 64 The opinion decided three different
issues: (1) whether the statewide districting plan was unconstitutional; (2)
whether the district map was unconstitutional as to Districts 23 and 25 under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (3) whether the district map was
unconstitutional as to District 24 under Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. 65 Due to the multitude of highly specific issues in the case, this comment
will focus only on the claim that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.
The comment will not, therefore, address any of the specific claims made by
the plaintiffs as to Districts 23, 24, or 25.
A.

Davis v. Bandemer

Prior to League, the Supreme Court first discussed statewide partisan
gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer. 66 In Bandemer, the Republicancontrolled Indiana legislature reapportioned its districts for both houses of the
state legislature. 67 In the 1982 election, Democratic candidates received a
majority of the total votes in the state House but failed to elect a majority of
60. Id.; League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
61. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607. The following cases were
joined and decided together on remand in Henderson and in the Supreme Court in League: Lee v.
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2978 (2006); GI Forum of Texas v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 829 (2005); Jackson v.
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005). In addition, the cases of Henderson v.
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2976 (2006), and Soechting v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2978 (2006), were decided on the
same day as League of United Latin American Citizens and under the same rationale.
62. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.
63. See generally id.
64. Parts II-A and III were the Opinion of the Court. Id. at 2594, 2604.
65. The plurality held that District 23 was illegal as it violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
(Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens concurred at least in the judgment, with
Roberts, Alito, Scalia and Thomas dissenting). The plurality held that District 24 was not
unconstitutional (Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, with
Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg filing three different dissents). Id. at 2626.
66. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
67. Id. at 113.
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seats. 68 Prior to the election, several Indiana Democrats filed suit, claiming
that the reapportionment constituted a partisan gerrymander which violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Based on the
legislature’s discriminatory intent and the discriminatory effect, as evidenced
by the 1982 elections, the district court invalidated the plan. 70
The Supreme Court decided two major issues in Bandemer. The first issue
was whether partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable question. 71 The
defendants in the case argued that the case was non-justiciable because it was a
political question. 72 Following Baker v. Carr, the Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of justiciably discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. . . .
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political
question’s presence. 73

The Court dismissed most of the political question factors as inapplicable to
the facts. 74 The majority held that since none of the Carr factors were present,
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable. 75
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
concurred only in the judgment because there were no judicially manageable
standards. 76 O’Connor dismissed the plurality’s standard as not judicially
manageable because it would require a court to make an analysis of the proper
proportionality of a reapportionment. 77 Since no judicially manageable
standard existed, partisan gerrymandering was a political question and was
thus non-justiciable. 78

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 118.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118.
Id. at 121-22 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Id. at 122-23.
Id.
Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 155-61.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 160.
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The second question in Bandemer was what standard should be used to
determine whether a partisan gerrymander has impermissibly violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The majority on the issue of justiciability could not
reach a consensus on an appropriate standard. According to the plurality, 79 the
plaintiffs must prove there was “intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” 80
If the plaintiffs meet this threshold question, the court should examine the
legislation for valid underpinnings. 81 The Bandemer plaintiffs did not pass the
threshold question of effect, so the Court did not address any of the other
issues. 82
In his dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, argued for a
broader standard based on several “neutral” criteria. 83 The most important
criteria were the district’s shape and the district’s adherence to established
subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or school districts. 84 Other factors
include the legislative process, legislative goals, population disparities, and
vote dilution. 85 No one factor could be dispositive, but the cumulative effect
would be to determine the “fairness of a redistricting plan.” 86 Based on the
application of the facts to these factors, Justice Powell determined that the
redistricting plan in Indiana violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 87
A majority in Bandemer recognized that the Constitution offers protection
against partisan gerrymanders; however, a majority failed to craft a workable
standard to determine when such an impermissible gerrymander occurs. The
standard proposed by the plurality eventually proved too strict to provide any
actual relief for citizens whose votes were nullified by partisan gerrymanders
and relief was denied in every claim of partisan gerrymander that followed
Bandemer. 88 While the Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution
precludes partisan gerrymanders, there proved to be no actual check on the
redistricting process.
Bandemer failed because the Court punted its
opportunity to control an unconstitutional legislative practice by advocating a
standard that provides no actual relief.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 113.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 162 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184-85.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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Vieth v. Jubelirer

Unsurprisingly, the Court’s opinions in Bandemer did not end the question
of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. The Supreme Court next
visited the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer. 89 In Vieth,
the plurality opinion, 90 written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and O’Connor, sought to overturn Bandemer. 91
Since judicial relief was denied in every case between Bandemer and Vieth, the
Bandemer plurality standard had proven unmanageable because it provided
virtually no guidance for the lower courts. 92 The number and variety of
proposed standards were evidence that no standard is judicially manageable. 93
The plurality argued partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable because no
judicially manageable standard exists to decide the constitutionality of such
causes of action. 94 In order to prove this argument, the plurality dismissed
each proposed standard. 95 This comment will, therefore, describe each
proposed standard, followed by the plurality’s rationale for dismissing each
standard.
1. Powell’s Bandemer standard
The plurality rejected Justice Powell’s standard from his dissent in
Bandemer. 96 The plurality described Powell’s standard as “a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis, where all conceivable factors, none of which is
dispositive, are weighed with an eye to ascertaining whether the particular
gerrymander . . . is not ‘fair.’” 97 The plurality dismissed Powell’s “fairness”
standard without justification, stating only that “[s]ome criterion more solid . . .
seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of

89. See generally id.
90. The four-justice plurality held that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable, but the
other five justices, for differing reasons, held the case to be justiciable. See id. Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment of the plurality. Id. at 267, 269.
91. Id. at 281.
92. Id. at 279-280, 282-83.
93. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292. “We preface [our consideration of the dissenter’s standards] with
the observation that the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different
standards—all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here
by appellants—goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible
standard.” Id.; but see id. at 368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Members of a majority might well seek
to reconcile such differences. But dissenters might instead believe that the more thorough,
specific reasoning that accompanies separate statements will stimulate further discussion. And
that discussion could lead to change in the law, where, as here, one member of the majority,
disagreeing with the plurality as to justiciability, remains in search of appropriate standards.”).
94. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 281-305.
96. Id. at 290-91.
97. Id. at 291.
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their districting discretion.” 98 The plurality’s rationale for dismissing Powell’s
Bandemer standard is unconvincing. “Fairness” has been used by the Court in
other areas of the law such as personal jurisdiction and due process. 99 The
broad standard proposed by Powell would likely lead to effective limitations of
partisan gerrymandering. “Fairness” as a standard, however, could make
consistency in the district courts difficult.
2. Plaintiffs’ Vieth standard
The plurality also considered and rejected a standard proposed by the
plaintiffs. 100 The plaintiffs’ standard maintained but modified the two prong
intent/effects test from Bandemer. 101 The plaintiffs’ standard required the
predominant intent of the legislature be to political gerrymander. 102 The
plurality dismissed this standard because it was unable to determine the
predominant intent of a legislative body. 103
Under the plaintiffs’ test, “[t]he requisite effect is established when (1) the
plaintiffs show that the districts systematically ‘pack’ and ‘crack’ the rival
party’s voters, and (2) the court’s examination of the ‘totality of
circumstances’ confirms that the map can thwart the plaintiffs’ ability to
translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats.” 104 The plurality denied
this part of the standard because the Constitution “guarantees equal protection
of the law [only] to persons, [and] not equal representation in government to
equivalently sized groups.” 105 Furthermore, even neutral districting schemes
could result in packing and cracking and a majority of statewide votes not
translating into a majority of seats. 106
The plaintiffs’ standard fails in both guidance and limitations. The
Bandemer plurality standard demonstrated that the intent/effects test is too
narrow. The modifications would not accomplish the necessary broadening of

98. Id.
99. While Justice Scalia believed that “fairness” was too indeterminate to be used as a
standard, previous opinions by the Supreme Court have used just such a standard. See id. The
Court used a standard of fairness in personal jurisdiction and Due Process claims. See, e.g., Rush
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980) (personal jurisdiction); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709,
2732 (2006) (due process). Justice Scalia provided no rationale for why “fairness” was an
appropriate standard in those cases but failed in partisan gerrymandering cases. See generally
Rush , 444 U.S. at 328; Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2732.
100. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-90.
101. Id. at 284.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 284-85.
104. Id. at 286-87 (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 288.
106. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289. The Court failed to address that where unintentional packing and
cracking occurs, there would be no problem because the map would pass the intent prong of the
analysis.
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the test to make it effective in limiting the legislatures. Additionally, little
guidance is provided to the lower courts on how to administer this test.
3. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
Justice Kennedy concurred with the judgment of the plurality but refrained
from finding that partisan gerrymandering is non-justiciable. 107 His basic
argument was that even though he could not currently determine a judicially
manageable standard, he would not now foreclose all future claims because of
the alleged infringement to constitutional rights. 108 He reasoned that since the
judiciary is willing to enter the districting fray for other scenarios, such as one
person-one vote and racial gerrymandering, partisan gerrymandering is
justiciable. 109 Finally, he believed that eighteen years of one unworkable
standard did not prove that there was no workable standard available. 110
The plurality rejected Kennedy’s concurrence as illogical and illegal. 111
The concurrence is illogical because it followed all the rationale for nonjusticiability but failed to follow it through to that logical conclusion. 112 The
plurality opinion suggested that lower courts treat Kennedy’s concurrence as a
“reluctant fifth vote against justiciability.” 113
Justice Kennedy recognized that partisan gerrymandering is a
constitutional problem, but his lack of standard provides no guidance
whatsoever to the lower courts. Furthermore, his opinion does nothing to curb
partisan gerrymandering now or in the future.
4. Justice Stevens’ dissent
Justice Stevens put forth a standard for determining unconstitutional
partisan gerrymanders. Stevens’ standard was based on the idea that when the
state legislature’s sole motivation is partisanship, without any pretense of
neutrality, the legislature violates its requirement to govern impartially. 114
Justice Stevens followed the standards set forth by the Court in various
racial gerrymandering cases. 115 Therefore, based on the standing requirements

107. Id. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
108. Id. at 309-10.
109. Id. at 310-11.
110. Id. at 311-12.
111. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion). The plurality believed Kennedy’s opinion was illegal
because it neither affirmed the district court, finding the claims justiciable but failing to meet a
standard for unconstitutionality, nor did it reverse, finding the claims non-justiciable. Id.
112. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301.
113. Id. at 305.
114. Id. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 327 (“in my view, racial and political gerrymanders are species of the same
constitutional concern”); see generally Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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in the racial gerrymandering cases, he believed that there was no standing for a
statewide claim of partisan gerrymandering. 116 A plaintiff, therefore, must
reside in a challenged district and allege a specific type of “representational
harm” 117—namely that the winner of the gerrymandered district does not
represent the whole district but only those responsible for its gerrymandered
win. 118
[The] danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the representative will perceive
that the people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather than
those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of her
constituency, but to no part of her constituency at all. The problem, simply
put, is that the will of the cartographers rather than the will of the people will
govern. 119

Assuming the plaintiff has standing to challenge the district, the plaintiff
must allege and prove that the district is an unusual shape, 120 irregular,121
peculiar, 122 or bizarre, 123 such as “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure.” 124
The irregular district alone is not a constitutional violation; the plaintiff must
also show that politics and partisanship were the predominant factors in the
legislature’s decision. 125
Other neutral districting principles, such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are objective
factors that may defeat a claim of partisan gerrymandering. 126 Foremost in
Stevens’ opinion was the intent of the legislature—whether it “allowed
partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all
neutral principles. . . . [I]f no neutral criterion can be identified to justify the
lines drawn, and if the only possible explanation for a district’s bizarre shape is
116. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Citizens challenging districting schemes
must reside in the districts that they challenge. Id. Stevens based this view on stare decisis from
Shaw v. Reno but would not suggest that a plaintiff would never have standing. Id. at 327, n.16.
117. Id. at 330 (citing Hays, 515 U.S. at 745).
118. Id. at 329. “When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency
as whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy.” Reno, 509
U.S. at 648. “Gerrymanders subvert that representative norm because the winner of an election in
a gerrymandered district inevitably will infer that her success is primarily attributable to the
architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by neutral principles.” Vieth, 541
U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 331.
120. Id. at 321 n.21.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 US
339, 340 (1960)).
125. Id. at 335 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995)).
126. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
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a naked desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists to
save the district.” 127
The plurality dismissed Justice Steven’s view that partisan gerrymandering
cases should follow racial gerrymandering cases because racial
gerrymandering is too distinct from partisan gerrymandering. 128
The
plurality’s rationale was that districting based on political entities is
contemplated and approved by the Constitution, 129 whereas districting by race
is unlawful. 130
Moreover, political affiliation “is rarely as readily
discernible—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race.
Political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one
election to the next.” 131 In sum, the plurality rejected Stevens’ standard not
because it is unmanageable, but because the accepted rationale for racial
gerrymandering does not apply to partisan gerrymandering. 132
Justice Stevens’ standard would definitely provide manageable standards
for the lower courts because the courts already apply these standards to cases
of racial gerrymandering. However, the standard would likely fail in its
purpose of restricting partisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering does
not occur district-by-district. The legislatures manipulate the entire map, not
just individual districts. Furthermore, his requirement that districts forsake all
neutral principles is unreasonable because districts could be gerrymandered,
while maintaining a single neutral districting principle, such as incumbent
protection, 133 geographical features, 134 or one person-one vote.
5. Justice Souter’s 135 dissent
Justice Souter’s dissent laid out a distinct and sophisticated test based on
the burden shifting standard first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 136 Plaintiffs must prove a prima case with five elements. 137 First,
plaintiffs must show that they identify with a cohesive political group. 138
Second, plaintiffs must show that their district “paid little or no heed to those
traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown
127. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 285-86 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 285; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
130. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286.
131. Id. at 287 (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 295. “This Court may not willy-nilly apply standards—even manageable
standards—having no relation to constitutional harms.” Id.
133. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
134. Morris, supra note 16.
135. Opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 342 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 346; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
137. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). For simplicity’s sake, Justice Souter
would only apply this test to single member districts. Id. at 346-47.
138. Id. at 347.
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straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions,
and conformity with geographic features like rivers and mountains.” 139 Third,
plaintiffs need to show how the unusual shape of the district helped or hurt one
party over the other. 140 Plaintiffs must show why specific lines were drawn,
based on the lines and the demographics of the area. 141 The overall plan
should compel an inference that the shape of the district was based on the
distribution of the plaintiff’s group. 142 Fourth, plaintiffs must present a
hypothetical district which would alleviate the problem of the gerrymander and
more closely follow traditional districting standards than the actual district. 143
Finally, plaintiffs must show that the defendants intentionally manipulated the
district to pack 144 or crack 145 the district. 146
Once plaintiffs meet these five criteria, the burden shifts to the defendants
who must show that the decisions were not based on “naked partisan
advantage.” 147 The state could show that the neutral objectives could not be
better served by the hypothetical district, or it could affirmatively establish
legitimate objectives, such as to avoid racial dilution, one person-one vote
compliance, proportional representation, or other legitimate objectives. 148
Justice Souter chose to postpone any definition for a statewide claim until the
Court has the benefit of analyzing the district specific claims. 149
The plurality rejected Justice Souter’s standard as more complicated but
equally unworkable. 150 While the tests are broken down, they are still
unanswerable because the question remains as to how much is too much. 151
The plurality stated that each of the last four prima facie “steps requires a
quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill suited to the development of
judicial standards.” 152 Justice Souter countered this argument by stating that

139. Id. at 347-48.
140. Id. at 349.
141. Id. The plaintiffs “would need to point to specific protuberances . . . that reach out to
include Democrats, or fissures in it that squirm away from Republicans.” Id.
142. Id.
143. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 349 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. “Pack” means to intentionally place a super-majority of members of one party in a
district, in order that all the votes go to only one candidate. Id. at 286 n.7 (plurality opinion).
145. “Cracking” involves splitting a pocket of members who may form a majority in a district
in order that they form a safe minority in several districts. Id.
146. Id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that intent was easily proved as
the legislature is not politically naïve, but he would only apply intent when the gerrymandering
party controls both houses and the governorship or is veto-proof by an adversarial governor. Id.
147. Id. at 351.
148. Id. at 351-52.
149. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 353 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 296-97 (plurality opinion).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 296.
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while the test may allow some partisan gerrymandering, it “does not make it
impossible for courts to identify at least the worst cases of gerrymandering,
and to provide a remedy. The most the plurality can show is that my approach
would not catch them all.” 153
The standard proposed by Justice Souter would work on both judicial
guidance and legislative limitations. The lower courts would have five distinct
elements to determine rather than the two-pronged intent/effects test. The
standard succeeds because it uses a presumption to shift the burden once the
plaintiff has met the prima facie case. It removes the difficult burden on the
plaintiff to prove the intent of the legislature. Importantly, if the state has a
legitimate state interest that cannot be met with another map, then the district
will be approved. The standard fails on one level because it provides relief
only for individual districts and not for a statewide map. As stated above,
partisan gerrymandering usually occurs on the statewide level, rather than
district by district.
6. Justice Breyer’s dissent
Justice Breyer first focused on what the plurality described as the
impossible problem, determining what the court is testing for. 154 He stated that
the Constitution, through its guarantee of democratic government, must
provide “a method for transforming the will of the majority into effective
government.” 155 Moreover, given the use of single-member districts in the
United States, political ramifications in districting are not only necessary but
beneficial. 156 Therefore, the use of political considerations, by itself, does not
violate the Constitution because it is justified by desirable goals, such as
minority party representation and stable legislatures. 157
While the use of political considerations is beneficial in some
circumstances, it can lead to serious abuse when it results in unjustified
entrenchment of a minority party in power. 158 “Unjustified entrenchment” is
defined as when a party that “enjoys only minority support among the
populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold legislative power
[which] . . . is purely the result of partisan manipulation and not other

153. Id. at 354-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 357-59. With non-random boundaries, under single member districts, a very small
shift in the political climate – 49% Republican to 51% Republican – could change the
government from 100% Democratic to 100% Republican. Id. at 357.
157. Id. at 360.
158. Id.
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factors.” 159 Such unjustified entrenchment leads to Constitutional violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. 160
Justice Breyer’s plan for determining when unjustified entrenchment
occurs was complex. He proposed that the factors fall along a continuum,
where the more entrenched the minority party is, the fewer indicia of abuse are
required. 161 For example, where few abuses are alleged but a majority party 162
twice fails to obtain a majority of seats and this failure cannot be explained by
neutral factors, then there would be an unconstitutional entrenchment. 163
Further down the continuum, if the disadvantaged party can show more indicia
of abuse and the majority party has once failed to obtain a majority of seats,
then “[t]hese circumstances could also add up to unconstitutional
gerrymandering.” 164 Finally, Justice Breyer also saw an unconstitutional
entrenchment when the indicia of abuse were extremely high (more than one
redistricting in a decade, radical departure from traditional districting
standards, or strong evidence that a minority will receive a majority of votes)
but the actual entrenchment had yet to occur. 165 This was based on his view
that “the presence of a mid-cycle redistricting, for any reason, raises a fair
inference that partisan machinations played a major role in the map-drawing
process.” 166
The plurality dismissed Justice Breyer’s standard as too vague and
unspecified. 167 On his continuum, the plurality had trouble understanding
where the line is drawn between an unconstitutional entrenchment and a
constitutional entrenchment because Breyer stated the second scenario “could”
be unconstitutional and the third scenario “may” be unconstitutional. 168 The
plurality appropriately felt this ambiguity left Justice Breyer’s test as too
undefined to be judicially manageable. 169
Justice Breyer’s standard fails in providing guidance to lower courts. His
continuum is poorly defined and would make it difficult for a district court
159. Id. Other justified factors include sheer happenstance, more than two major parties,
Senate election scheme, or reliance on traditional districting criteria. Id. at 360-61.
160. Id. at 362.
161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Justice Breyer defines a majority party as the party that receives the most votes actually
cast in a race for its candidates in a particular race. So the if the Republicans got the most votes
cast for the U.S. House of Representatives in that state, they would be the majority party for that
race in that state. Id. at 366.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 366-67.
166. Id. at 367.
167. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion). “In sum, we neither know precisely what
Justice Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what fails the test.” Id.
168. Id. at 299-300.
169. Id. at 300.
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judge to determine when a violation has occurred. Also, his requirement of an
“unjustified entrenchment” makes the test too narrow. There is as much
danger in a majority creating a supermajority as there is in a minority holding
on to power. 170
Vieth fails for many of the same reasons that Bandemer failed. First, no
opinion could garner a majority of the Court. This leaves the lower courts
unable to determine the appropriate approach to a partisan gerrymandering
case. The cases remain justiciable, as Bandemer is still good law on that point.
No standard, however, is available for lower courts to use to make a
determination on the merits of the case. District court judges presented with a
partisan gerrymandering claim must either dismiss the case because the facts
do not meet the unknown standard, or choose or create a standard and apply it
to the facts. If a judge finds the district map invalid, the finding will likely be
reversed for having chosen the ‘wrong’ standard. Vieth fails because it
provides no guidance for lower courts.
Vieth also fails because it provides neither guidance nor limitations on the
state legislatures. The longer the Supreme Court fails to strike down a map for
partisan gerrymandering, the bolder the legislatures will get in drawing the
partisan maps. Every election that is predetermined by a gerrymandered map
violates a citizen’s right to vote and right to equal protection. 171 Furthermore,
the more partisan the map, the more partisan the individuals elected. On both
sides of the aisle, more extreme individuals will be elected, resulting in a major
gap in the political middle, where most Americans actually reside. 172
C. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
In League, the Court again failed to reach a majority on any significant
issue with regards to partisan gerrymandering. Majority consensus only
existed as to the scope of the issue—that the opinion does not address the
question of justiciability. 173 Partisan gerrymanders are justiciable, 174 but
disagreement remains over any substantive standard to apply. 175 League
addressed two issues of partisan gerrymandering: 1) whether redistricting mid-

170. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
171. See infra pp. 33-34.
172. Dann, supra note 7.
173. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2595, 2607 (2006).
174. Bandemer is still the applicable case law because no majority has overturned it. Id.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito give no opinion on the issue of justiciability, as it was not
argued in this case. Id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since
both of the recently departed justices (Rehnquist and O’Connor) supported non-justiciability in
Vieth, it is doubtful that a majority would have formed declaring partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable.
175. Id. at 2607 (majority opinion).
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decade violates the Constitution, and 2) what standard should be applied to
determine an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. 176
1. The League plurality opinion 177
The plurality stated that the Constitution allocates the primary
responsibility of drawing district maps to the states and their legislatures.178
Only in necessary circumstances, such as a failure to comply with the one
person-one vote requirement or because of an imminent election, should
federal district courts be saddled with the “unwelcome obligation” of drawing
a district map. 179 The act is unwelcome because it is one of the most
significant acts of a state in ensuring the rights of citizens in the voting
process. 180 Importantly, there is no constitutional or Congressional ban on a
state legislature redrawing a district map to replace a map previously drawn by
either the legislature or a federal court. 181 Furthermore, there is no
presumption of impropriety placed upon a legislature that chooses to redraw a
judicially drawn map in the middle of the decade. 182
The plaintiffs presented a standard similar to the standard presented by
Justice Stevens in his dissent in Vieth. 183 The plaintiffs modified Justice
Stevens’ predominant intent standard by placing a presumption of invalidity on
a mid-decade redistricting plan. 184 The focus of the plaintiffs’ query was not
necessarily the district lines but the choice to redistrict in itself. 185
The Court rejected the circumstance of mid-decade redistricting as tipping
the balance toward unconstitutionality. 186 There is no presumption that a middecade redistricting is unconstitutional. 187 Furthermore, it is an anathema to
rule that a highly partisan redistricting that coincides with the census would be
constitutional, while a less effective mid-decade partisan gerrymander would
be unconstitutional. 188 This rule would likely lead to partisan excess at the
beginning of each decade, accompanied by minority toe-dragging because
176. Id.
177. Opinion by Kennedy which is joined by Souter and Ginsburg, and in which Roberts and
Alito concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2604.
178. Id. at 2607-08.
179. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing Wise v. Lipscomb,
437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; but see infra pp. 33-35.
183. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra Part
III.B.4.
184. League of United Latin American Citizens 126 S. Ct. at 2609.
185. Id. at 2609.
186. Id. at 2610.
187. Id.; but see infra text accompanying notes 252-257.
188. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2610.
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opposition leaders may feel they have a better chance with the judiciary than
by negotiating with the majority. 189
Finally, the Court stated that a partisan gerrymander by the majority is
more appropriate than one conducted by a minority. 190 While there is no
requirement of proportional representation, the Court felt that there is less of a
problem when a statewide majority takes a more substantial share of
Congressional seats that when a statewide minority holds the majority of
seats. 191
The Court also dismissed a standard for symmetry proposed by one of the
amici briefs. Under this symmetry standard, the court would look at how well
the minority party would fare if the votes were equal. 192 For example, under
Plan 1374C, Republicans would have an eight seat advantage if the votes for
statewide office were 50%-50% between Democrats and Republicans. 193 This
advantage would violate the symmetry standard because there was a significant
deviation from proportionality even when one party did not dominate the vote
statewide. 194 The Court correctly pointed out that the degree of asymmetry
depends “on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will reside.” 195
Even if this problem could be solved, the Court did not feel comfortable
determining constitutionality based on hypothetical situations. 196 Furthermore,
the symmetry standard proposed by the amici brief did not specify how much
deviance is too much. 197 Because of these problems, the Court elected not to
use the symmetry standard. 198
The plaintiffs also argued that mid-decade redistricting for purely partisan
purposes violates the one person-one vote requirement established by Baker v.
Carr. 199 The standard is based on the fact that since people move within the
state, districts that are equal in population in 2000 will not remain equal.

189. Id. at 2611.
190. Id. at 2610.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2610-11.
193. Twenty seats out of thirty-two total seats. Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
194. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 2611 (plurality opinion).
196. Id.
197. Id.; but see id. at 2638 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is up
to the Court and not social scientists to determine the amount of deviance, but 10% does not seem
like an unreasonable number. Id.
198. Id. at 2611 (plurality opinion).
199. Id. It should also be noted that Judge Ward of the district court would have granted
relief under this one person-one vote theory on remand, when it was first argued, if he was not
constrained by the Supreme Court’s direction to consider the case only in light of Vieth. Id. at
2607; Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 784-85 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
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“[P]opulation variances in legislative districts are tolerated only if they ‘are
unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for
which justification is shown.’” 200
Plaintiffs argued that the legal fiction that population data remains accurate
throughout the decade applies only when such a fiction promotes important
state interests. 201 Such important interests include avoidance of constant
redistricting and the ensuing instability (when applied to a decennial plan years
after it has been enacted) and compliance with the Constitution and voting
rights legislation (when applied to a belated court-drawn plan drawn a few
years after the census). 202 This standard would require a legislature to justify
its mid-decade redistricting “when there was no legal compulsion” to
redistrict. 203 Under this standard, the Texas legislature would be unable to
justify their mid-decade redistricting because the motivation behind the
voluntary redistricting was to achieve partisan goals. 204
The Court characterized this argument as the same argument that middecade redistricting, is per se unconstitutional. 205 The Court dismissed the
argument for the same reasons it concluded that there is no inference that middecade redistricting is unconstitutional. 206
Without the use of an inference, the plurality is left in its self-created
purgatory of stating that partisan gerrymandering may be unconstitutional but
without any standard to determine when and how such a decision will be made.
Without an appropriate standard submitted, the Court merely affirmed that the
facts do not meet some standard, whatever that standard may be. The
plurality’s opinion once again failed to provide any guidance to lower courts or
any limitations on state legislatures.
2. Justice Stevens’ dissent 207
Justice Stevens dissented, as he believed that the state violated its duty to
govern impartially. 208

200. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2611 (quoting Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983)) (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2611-12.
204. Id. at 2606.
205. Id. at 2612.
206. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2612; see supra pp. 24-25.
207. Stevens is joined by Justice Breyer as to Parts I and II. Both Justices concur with the
Court in their invalidation of District 23 in Part III of the Court’s opinion. League of United
Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2626 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
208. Id. at 2626.
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When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery or defining
electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the entire
community. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment—
whether racial, ethnic, religious, or political—that may occupy a position of
strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak
segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. 209

Stevens first established his belief that the “maintenance of existing district
boundaries is advantageous to both voters and candidates.” 210 More than eight
million Texans were put into different districts, and on the whole, the districts
were less compact under Plan 1374C than they were under Plan 1151C. 211
Justice Stevens framed the issue narrowly as a question of first impression
for the Court: “[W]hether it was unconstitutional for Texas to replace a lawful
districting plan in the middle of a decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing
partisan advantage.” 212 The issue was not on the contours of lines on the map
but on the decision to redraw the map in the first place. 213 Since the issue was
not about the map but about the decision to redraw the map, Stevens argued
that it is undeniably within the judiciary’s ability to determine the motive
behind the map. 214 “[T]he presence of midcycle redistricting, for any reason,
raises a fair inference that partisan machinations played a major role in the map
drawing process.” 215 The case at hand clearly supported that such a
determination is feasible because the district court, in fact, had made such a
determination. 216
Upon concluding that it was within the purview of the district courts to
determine when mid-decade redistricting is motivated solely by partisanship,
Justice Stevens turned to whether such a motivation is sufficient to establish a
constitutional violation. 217 Distinguishing League from Upham v. Seamon,218
Justice Stevens concluded then that the decision to redistrict solely to

209. Id. at 2641 (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
210. Id. at 2626.
211. Id. at 2630.
212. Id. at 2631 (internal quotes omitted).
213. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2631-32.
214. Id. at 2632.
215. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 367 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
216. Id. “There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature
in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage.” Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451,
470 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
217. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
218. Id. at 2633-34; but see Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (Upham stands for the
proposition that a legislature is authorized to redraw a court-drawn map only when the district
court has exceeded it remedial authority).
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maximize partisan advantage and without any justifiable state interest violates
the state’s duty to govern impartially, established by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 219
3. Part III of Justice Stevens’ Dissent 220
According to Justice Stevens, not only was drawing the map mid-decade
unconstitutional, but this map would be unconstitutional if drawn at the start of
a decade. 221 In an attempt to again put forth judicially manageable standards
for the lower courts to follow, Justice Stevens supported use of the symmetry
standard. 222
As stated above, the symmetry standard compares the number of votes
statewide for each party as compared to the number of seats elected. 223 “The
symmetry standard requires that the electoral system treat similarly-situated
parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction of the legislative seats
for a particular vote percentage as the other party would receive if it had
received the same percentage.” 224 After starting with base numbers from an
election, the numbers of statewide votes are then varied to determine how
many seats each party would receive with a higher or lower percentage of
statewide votes. 225 According to the amici brief and experts for both the
plaintiff and the state, Republicans in Texas would likely be able to carry
twenty-two of thirty-two seats with only 52% of the vote, and they could carry
twenty seats with as little as 49% of the statewide vote. 226 Justice Stevens
proposed that a symmetry deviation 227 over 10% should be enough to shift the
burden to the State to defend the plan. 228

219. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2634. The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits invidious discrimination and requires state action to be supported by a
legitimate state interest, while the First Amendment protects citizens from official retaliation
based on political affiliation and also prevents the State from penalizing citizens because of their
political participation or beliefs. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220. Not joined by Breyer. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2626.
221. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 2636.
223. Id. at 2636-37.
224. Id. at 2637 (internal quotes omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2636-37. The data relied on is from Professor Gadie, the state’s expert in the case.
Id. In the 2006 election, Republicans received 47% of the statewide vote for U.S. House of
Representatives, yet still won nineteen of the thirty-two seats. CNN.com, America Votes 2006 –
Texas, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/ results/states/TX/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2007).
227. A symmetry deviation is created by comparing the percentage of seats each party would
receive if each party had 50% of the statewide vote. For example, under 1374C, the Republicans
would win 62.5% (20 of 32) compared to the Democrats getting 37.5% (12 of 32). This would
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Justice Stevens also emphasized that an effective partisan gerrymander
affects more than the minority party’s ability to elect its candidates; it also
limits the losing party’s role in influencing the elected candidate. 229 In
general, our electoral system expects the winning candidate to take the
minority interest into account because the minority may later become the
majority. 230 On the other hand, when the district is obviously created to
effectuate solely the interests of one group, “elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that
group, rather than their constituency as a whole.” 231 Furthermore, in this case,
the Representatives may feel that they owe their success and access to the
cartographers of the map and not to their constituents. 232
Justice Stevens concluded that it was clear that Plan 1374C placed a severe
burden on Texas Democrats because the plan created nineteen to twenty-two
safe seats for Republicans. 233 The harm was more than hypothetical because
the safe seats reduced the likelihood that Republicans occupying those seats
would be responsive to the interests of Texas Democrats. Therefore, Plan
1374C, in both intent and effect, violated the state’s duty to govern impartially.
Justice Stevens’ dissent provides both guidance and limitations. In terms
of the mid-decade redistricting, the inference of impropriety helps the judiciary
determine when a violation has occurred, and it makes it more likely that
partisan gerrymanders will be eliminated in between censuses. The symmetry
standard also provides a concrete formula to determine when gerrymandering
becomes unconstitutional. Again, this will help the judiciary in determining
how much is too much and it will curb many legislative abuses.
4. Other Dissents in League
As stated previously, this case contained six different opinions. The
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Stevens spent the most time on the issue of
partisan gerrymanders. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, preserved
the principle that partisan gerrymandering may be considered a violation of the

result in a symmetry deviation of 25% (62.5% - 37.5%). League of United Latin American
Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2638-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. Id. at 2639 n.9. While a 10% deviation would work for larger states like Texas or
California, a different standard may be needed for less populous states. See infra note 268.
229. Id. at 2638-39.
230. Id. at 2639; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (“The power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections.”).
231. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2639 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2640. This statement remains true even though the Republicans only won eighteen
seats in 2006, because one of the seats that the Republicans lost was District 23. District 23 had
to be redrawn after League due to violations of the Voting Rights Act.
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Equal Protection Clause. 234 Justice Souter did not work through his standard
set forth in Vieth because there was no majority on either an acceptable
standard or the overall unconstitutionality of Plan 1374C. 235 He did, however,
reject Justice Kennedy’s view that the process used in redistricting cannot play
a role in the determination of constitutionality. 236 Nor did he rule out the
possibility that the proposed symmetry test may be used to establish an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 237
Justice Breyer also dissented in part on his own. 238 He too would have
rejected Plan 1374C on its face because of its risk of entrenchment of the
Republican Party. 239 Because the district map would give the Republicans a
majority of seats even when they received a minority of statewide votes, 240
Plan 1374C violated Breyer’s standard as declared in Vieth. 241 The State had
not even attempted to justify the plan on any other ground other than partisan
advantage. 242 Therefore, the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. 243
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, concurred separately in the
judgment in regards to partisan gerrymandering. 244 As neither Justice had
ruled on the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders, they took no position on
the issue, as it was not argued in this case. 245 They did concur in the Court’s
disposition, that even if the case is justiciable, these plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. 246
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reiterated his view from Vieth
that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable. 247 No party had yet put forth a
judicially manageable standard by which to measure the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymanders. 248 He again chided the Court for disposing of the case

234. Id. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra Part III.B.5.
235. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2647.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens as to Parts I and II of his opinion. Id. at 2651
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Id. at 2652.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-196, 212-221.
241. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See supra Part III.B.6; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 359 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
243. Id.
244. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
248. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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without either setting a standard by which to measure the claim or declaring
these claims to be non-justiciable. 249
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
In its decision in League, the Supreme Court failed once again in its
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.
The most disturbing aspect is the lack of guidance offered to lower courts.
Partisan gerrymandering is in a perpetual state of purgatory. District courts are
left with no viable options. The district courts cannot dismiss the cases as nonjusticiable because, as of today, the majority decision on justiciability in
Bandemer is still applicable. Yet the lower courts have no standard by which
to judge the facts. Any decision to invalidate a map will likely be reversed by
a court of appeals or the Supreme Court because no defined standard currently
exists.
The current status of partisan gerrymandering cases is indefensible. The
Supreme Court must reach a majority on the issue the next time it comes up. A
failure to settle the law leaves all participants in the predicament of not
knowing what the law is. To quote former President Bill Clinton, “Strong and
wrong [is better than] weak and right.” 250 The most important aspect of these
cases is for a firm majority decision to be made.
A majority determination that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable is
inappropriate. It would settle the law in terms of the judiciary, but it would
still leave legislatures with no boundaries or limitations. The state legislatures,
left to their own accord, cannot be trusted to adequately address the problem.
Given the opportunity, a majority party (by number of seats) will do whatever
it can to maintain and extend its majority.
After League, there are no limits on the legislature. In the extreme, a state
legislature could redraw district lines before every election in order to assure
greater success in that particular election. District maps could be drawn to
benefit or disadvantage specific candidates. Opponents of judicial intervention
will argue that if the electorate is dissatisfied with elected officials, then the
people can vote them out of office. 251 This argument fails because state
legislatures not only draw district maps for the U.S. House of Representatives
but also for the state legislatures. In other words, state legislators control their
249. Id.
250. Peter Brown, ‘Strong and Wrong vs. Weak and Right,’ Jan. 15, 2007,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/strong_and_wrong_vs_weak_and_r.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2007) (quoting President Bill Clinton).
251. “There used to be a theory that gerrymandering was self-regulating. . . . The idea was
that the more greedy you are in maximizing the number of districts your party can control, the
more likely it is that a small shift of votes will lead you to lose a lot of districts. But it’s not selfregulating anymore. The software is too good, and the partisanship is too strong.” Toobin, supra
note 12.
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own districts. A majority party that begins to lose popular support can
maintain power by simply redrawing the lines. 252
Partisan gerrymandering is not merely a matter of politics; it directly
implicates the peoples’ constitutional rights. The right to vote and to have
one’s voted counted is constitutionally protected. 253
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. 254

By intentionally cracking and packing citizens into districts so as to make their
individual votes meaningless, the state violates its citizens’ right to vote
equally as much as violations of one person-one vote or racial gerrymandering
violates those rights. That one form of vote dilution (disproportionate
representation) is unconstitutional while another form of vote dilution (packing
and cracking) is valid strikes at the heart of absurdity.
The current situation is clearly unsatisfactory. League leaves the judiciary
with no guidance and the legislature with no limits. While ruling that partisan
gerrymanders are non-justiciable would ease the burden on the judiciary, it
would still leave the legislatures unrestrained. Therefore, two issues must be
decided: (1) When is it permissible for a legislature to redistrict; and (2) what
standard should be used to determine when a partisan gerrymander is
unconstitutional.
League provided the Court with the new issue of whether a mid-decade
redistricting is constitutional. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every
second year by the people of the several states, and . . . shall be apportioned
among the several states which may be included within this union, according
to their respective numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made . . .
every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law
direct. 255

This section provides the constitutional basis for finding that districting should
occur after every census and only after the census. Mid-decade redistricting
will not be unconstitutional in absolutely every case, but there should be a
rebuttable inference that mid-decade redistricting is impermissible. Therefore,

252. Regardless of whether the gerrymandering party is Republican or Democrat, a
significant segment of the population will applaud the continual gerrymandering. This strong
sector of support may be enough to maintain a majority of seats, even if most other popular
support is lost.
253. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
254. Id.
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2.
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if there are legitimate reasons for redistricting in the middle of the decade, such
as a dramatic population shift or violation of one person-one vote, then
redistricting could be allowed. However, the burden will be on the legislature
to prove that legitimate state interests are the basis for redistricting. As the
plurality pointed out in League, a presumption of invalidity for mid-decade
redistricting could simply encourage partisan excess at the beginning of the
decade. 256 While this may be true, this presumption eliminates the worst-case
scenarios. The fact that this inference does not end all abuses does not mean
that it should not be implemented to end some abuse.
In addition to eliminating mid-decade partisan gerrymanders, the Court
should implement a standard to determine when census-based redistricting
constitutes a partisan gerrymander. In Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth, he
argued that eighteen years of Bandemer had proven that there was no judicially
manageable standard. 257 He stated that no majority was able to agree upon a
standard and “the lower courts have [not], over [eighteen] years, succeeded in
shaping the standard.” 258 Since Bandemer, the lower courts, however, did not
try to craft standards, but instead they applied the plurality standard from
Bandemer. It is not as Justice Scalia stated, that time has proven that no
standard exists. Time has only proven that the standard advocated by the
plurality in Bandemer fails. That standard proved to be too strict in its
application, preventing any relief from being granted.
The Court erred in Vieth and League by not providing a standard for the
lower courts to implement. While any proposed standard is unlikely to correct
all partisan gerrymanders, an attempt must be made. The status quo, as
explained above, is untenable.
In Bandemer, Vieth, and League, the dissenting Justices suggested a
variety of approaches for an appropriate standard. The use of any of the
proposed standards, with the exception of the Bandemer plurality standard,
would be better than no standard at all. The best course of action, however,
would combine aspects of several different standards.
This proposed standard would follow Justice Souter’s burden shifting
formula from Vieth. 259 This standard, however, would not be limited to claims
on individual districts. Rather, the standard would apply to both single district
claims and statewide claims. The initial burden would be on the plaintiffs.
They would be required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1)
they are a member of a cohesive political party; (2) their individual district (or

256.
257.
258.
259.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2610-11 (2006).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-281 (2004).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 347-352 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the entire statewide plan 260) ignored traditional districting criteria, such as
“contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity
with geographic features such as rivers and mountains;” 261 (3) the district (or
statewide plan) was drawn so as to disadvantage their particular political party;
(4) they would need to present the court with a hypothetical district (or
statewide map) which deviates less from traditional districting standards than
the actual district; and (5) the defendants acted intentionally to disadvantage
their group.
In regards to the statewide plan, the third and fourth requirements would
use a modified symmetry standard as suggested by Justice Stevens in
League. 262 Justice Stevens suggested a 10% rule in regards to the symmetry
standard. 263 While 10% is an appropriate figure in states with a large
population and a correspondingly large number of representatives, it fails in
smaller states. For example, in a state with five representatives, if both parties
get exactly 50% of the statewide vote, it is not an unconstitutional gerrymander
because the Democrats got 20% more of the seats (three seats to two seats).
Therefore, in smaller states with ten or fewer representatives, the standard of
deviation from equality must be a minimum of 10% and more than two
representatives. 264 Additionally, the map proposed by the plaintiffs must not
unfairly discriminate against the opposing party.
Once the plaintiff has met the prima facie requirements, the burden will
shift to the defendants to defend the map based on legitimate state interests.
The presumption of invalidity on the map is the same as the presumption of
invalidity if mid-decade redistricting occurs. 265 The presumption is rebuttable
and may be defeated by evidence of legitimate state interests such as
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, 266 compliance with one person-one
vote, proportional representation, 267 or incumbent protection. 268 This list is not

260. It would probably be impossible to show that every district in a statewide plan ignored
traditional districting criteria. Therefore, for the statewide plan, the plaintiffs would have to show
that in general, the plan ignores traditional districting criteria.
261. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting).
262. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2635-41 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. at 2638, n.9.
264. In a state with ten Representatives, where each party receives 50% of the statewide vote,
but the Republicans receive six seats compared to the Democrats’ four seats, there would be no
violation of the modified symmetry standard because there was not more than a two seat
difference. On the other hand, a state with nine Representatives that splits six-three with equal
votes would violate the modified symmetry standard.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 256-258.
266. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
267. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (In Gaffney, the Supreme Court
approved a Connecticut plan which advocated gerrymandering, but in proportion to each party’s
percentage of statewide vote).
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exhaustive. The burden is on the defendants to show that the predominant
rationale behind the map was not to disadvantage their political rivals. While
in every redistricting process there will be mixed motives, the defendants must
show that their predominant intent was something other than political
advantage. The defendants’ rationale for the map must not be a mere pretext
for political advantage. Evidence to consider would include the legislative
process (partisan or bipartisan), other maps proposed that also met state
interests, neutral districting criteria, the shapes of districts, and the relative
change from a previous map.
If the defendants can show that the map is based on legitimate state
interests, then the burden shifts one final time to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
must then show that the purported state interest is merely a pretext for partisan
gerrymander—that the true purpose behind the map is partisan gerrymander,
and that the purported state interest is met equally under the plaintiffs’
proposed map. If the plaintiffs are able to meet this very difficult burden, then
the state’s map should be thrown out.
If a legislatively drawn map is deemed unconstitutional, the court may
implement any of the following remedies. The court may send the map back to
the legislature one time to be redrawn, subject to the approval of the court
before it is implemented. If time does not permit the first option or if the
legislature fails to draw an appropriate map, the court may implement the
plaintiffs’ suggested map, if the map is appropriate. Lastly, the court may
create its own map, keeping in mind constitutional requirements, legitimate
state interests, and neutral districting criteria. Once a map has been approved
by the court, that map should remain in place until the next census period. The
legislature may petition the court to change the map prior to the next census
but only if constitutional requirements or legitimate state interests require it.
Like any theoretical plan, this proposed standard would prove imperfect.
Appropriate changes may be required in the future. The lack of perfection,
however, should not prevent the implementation of the standard. The status
quo of partisan gerrymandering is intolerable and must be changed. The
Supreme Court must no longer abdicate its responsibility. It must end these
current practices and implement an appropriate standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Gerrymandering for purely partisan purposes is a violation of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides for all citizens to get an equal vote.
By partisan gerrymandering, the politicians have taken away the right to vote
for the U.S. House of Representatives for many Americans. Three separate
268. For a discussion on the legitimacy of incumbent protection as a legitimate constitutional
goal see Walter M. Frank, Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case Against Gerrymandering to
Protect Congressional Incumbents, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227 (2006).
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bodies—the judiciary, Congress, and the state legislatures—have the capacity
to restore the power to the people. It is foolhardy to expect the legislative
branches to advocate reform, as they are the primary perpetrators. As is often
the case, responsibility to remedy this injustice falls on the judiciary. Over the
past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has failed in its responsibility. The
Court’s inability to reach a consensus on an appropriate standard to determine
when a partisan gerrymander becomes unconstitutional is inexcusable. As
computer software and demographic information becomes more sophisticated
and specific, no amount of informed voter discontent will be able to dislodge
the unconstitutional gerrymanders. Without action by Congress, the state
legislature, or the Supreme Court, elections will no longer be decided by
Americans; rather cartographers will elect the people’s House.
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